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World Health Law: Toward a New Conception of Global
Health Governance for the 21st Century
Lawrence 0. Gostin, J.D., LL.D.*
The international community joined together during the late
twentieth century to form a world trade system. Although imperfect, the
world trade system contains adjudicable and enforceable norms designed
to facilitate global economic activity. Human health is at least as important
as trade in terms of its effects on the wellbeing of populations. Moreover,
health hazards-biological, chemical, and radionuclear-have profound
global implications. Whether these threats' origins are natural, accidental,
or intentional, the harms, as well as the response, transcend national
frontiers and warrant a transnational response. Despite their high
importance, the International Health Regulations (IHR) are antiquated,
limited in scope, and burdened by inflexible assumptions and entrenched
power structures.' This essay examines problems of obsolescence, narrow
reach, and rigidity associated with the IHR, and proposes a new
conception for world health law in the 21st Century.
ANTIQUATED GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE:
THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE IHR
The origins of the IHR, the only global rules governing the
international spread of infectious diseases, date back to the first
International Sanitary Conference, held in Paris in 1851 to address the
European cholera epidemics. During the latter half of the nineteenth
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1. Lawrence 0. Gostin, International Infectious Disease Law: Revision of the World Health
Organization's International Health Regulations, 291 JAMA 2623 (2004) [hereinafter Gostin,
IHR].
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century, ten sanitary conferences were held and eight conventions were
negotiated (most did not come into force) to address the trans-boundary
effects of infectious diseases. The International Sanitary Convention
dealing with cholera was adopted in Venice in 1892, followed by another
Convention dealing with plague in 1897.2 In 1903, the International
Sanitary Convention replaced the conventions of 1892 and 1897."
At the turn of the twentieth century, the international community
established regional and international institutions to enforce these
conventions. American states set up the International Sanitary Bureau
(ISB) in 1902, which became the Pan American Sanitary Bureau (PASB), a
precursor to the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) . European
States developed their own multilateral institution in 1907, L'Office
International d'Hygi~ne Publique (OIHP) . The Health Organization of
the League of Nations (HOLN) was formed between the two world wars in
1923.6 Article XXIII of the League of Nations Covenant meekly stated that
members would "endeavor to take steps in matters of international
concern for the prevention and control of disease." The ISB, OIHP, and
HOLN were separate institutions, without harmonization of goals or
practices.
The United Nations was established after the horrors of World War I. 7
One of the U.N.'s primary functions was the protection of global health.
The World Health Organization (WHO) was established by the U.N. in
order to fulfill this mandate.8 Its preamble expresses universal aspirations9
2. INT'L HEALTH REGULATIONS REVISION PROJECT, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION:
GLOBAL CRISIS-GLOBAL SOLUTIONS: MANAGING PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES OF
INTERNATIONAL CONCERN THROUGH THE REVISED INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS 1,
WHO Doc. WHO/CDS/CSR/GAR/2002.4 (2002), http://www.who.int/csr/resources/
publications/ihr/whocdsgar20024.pdf.
3. International Sanitary Convention, Dec. 3, 1903, 35 Stat. 1770, 1 Bevans 359.
4. PAN AM. HEALTH ORG., PRO SALUTE NOVI MUNDI: A HISTORY OF THE PAN AMERICAN
HEALTH ORGANIZATION (1992), http://165.158.1.110/english/pro-salute/contents.htm;
Agreement Between the World Health Organization and the Pan American Health Organization,
WHA Res. 2.91 (June 30, 1949), in WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION BASIC DOCUMENTS 38
(44th ed. 2003).
5. See DAVID P. FIDLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES 24 (1999).
6. See id.
7. Article 55 of the U.N. Charter states that a primary objective of the U.N. is to
promote "higher standards of living" and "solutions of international.., health . . .
problems." U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
8. Yukata Arai-Takahashi, The Role of International Health Law and WHO in the Regulation
of Public Health, in LAW AND THE PUBLIC DIMENSION OF HEALTH 113 (Robyn Martin & Linda
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stating that its "principles are basic to the happiness, harmonious relations
and security of all peoples."' ° The WHO Constitution grants the agency the
power to seek Member State adoption of conventions (Article 19),"
promulgate regulations (Article 21), and make recommendations (Article
23) 12
Pursuant to the agency's Article 21 power, WHO Member States
adopted the International Sanitary Regulations (ISR) on July 25, 1951. The
ISR were renamed the International Health Regulations in 1969.13 The
IHR initially applied to six diseases: cholera, plague, relapsing fever,
smallpox, typhus, and yellow fever. The IHR were slightly modified in 1973
(particularly for cholera) and again in 1981 (to exclude smallpox, in view
of its global eradication). The IHR currently apply only to cholera, plague,
and yellow fever-the same diseases originally discussed at the first
International Sanitary Conference in 1851. Thus the IHR have not been
significantly changed since the ISR's initial adoption in 1951 and predate
modern health threats such as HIV/AIDS, SARS, and bioterrorism.
The 1995 World Health Assembly (WHA), in response to outbreaks of
Johnson eds., 2001).
9. Frank P. Grad, The Preamble of the Constitution of the World Health Organization, 80
BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 981 (2002).
10. World Health Organization Constitution, July 22, 1946, pmbl., 62 Stat. 2679, 14
U.N.T.S. 185, 186-187; see alsoYutaka Arai-Takahashi, supra note 8.
11. The only WHO Convention adopted pursuant to this power is the Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control adopted in 2003. W-O Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control, WHA Res. 56.1, World Health Assembly, 56th Ass., 4th plen. mtg, Agenda Item 13,
Annex, WHO Doc. A56.VR/4 (May 21, 2003), http://www.who.int/tobacco/fctc/
text/en/fctc-en.pdf.
12. See Allyn L. Taylor et al., International Health Instruments: An Overview, in OXFORD
TEXTBOOK OF PUBLIC HEALTH 359 (Roger Detels et al. eds., 4 th ed. 2002).
13. The current IHR contain several broad requirements for Member States: (1)
Notifications-Countries must report to the WHO any case of these diseases, occurring in
humans in their territories, and give further notification when an area is free from
infection. (2) Health Standards at Points of Arrival and Departure-Countries must adopt
hygiene measures at ports, airports, frontier posts, and on international cargo, goods,
baggage, containers, and other articles. Hygiene measures include providing potable water
and wholesome food; conducting inspections of equipment, installations, and premises;
and maintaining facilities for isolation and care of infected persons, and for disinfecting,
disinsecting, and deratting. (3) Health Documents-Countries may require health and
vaccination certificates for travelers from infected to non-infected areas. (4) Maximum
Measures-The health measures permitted by the IHR are "the maximum measures
applicable to international traffic, which a State may require for the protection of its
territory." Gostin, IHR supra note 1, at 2624.
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cholera in Peru, plague in India, and Ebola hemorrhagic fever in Zaire,
resolved to revise the IHR.14 Since that time, the WHA1 5 and other WHO
governance structures16 have affirmed the importance of the reform
process. The WHO Secretariat published a proposed revision of the IHR
on January 12, 2004.7 Member States reviewed the draft during regional
consultations and then in inter-governmental negotiations, with a view to
adoption by the WHA in 2005.8
THE PROBLEMS OF SOVEREIGNTY,
HORIZONTAL GOVERNANCE, AND ENTRENCHED POWER
Global health governance, then, is antiquated and sharply limited in
scope. Even within its narrow reach, the WHO has experienced marked
difficulties in enforcing the IHR in each content area."' Why have nation
states thus far resisted global health governance when they have acceded to
global trade governance? Although perhaps not as readily quantifiable as
economic gains from free trade, the trans-boundary effects of health
hazards are profound. Biological, chemical, and radionuclear agents all
have far-reaching consequences. With our modern system of global trade
14. Revision and Updating of the International Health Regulations, WI-A Res. 48.7, World
Health Assembly, 48th Ass., 12th plen. mtg. (May 12, 1995).
15. Global Health Security: Epidemic Alert and Response, WHA Res. 54.14, World Health
Assembly, 54th Ass., 9th plen. mtg (May 21, 2001); Revision of the International Health
Regulations, WHA Res. 56.28, World Health Assembly, 56th Ass., 10th plen. mtg. (May 28,
2003).
16. See Revision of the International Health Regulations: Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS)-Report by the Secretariat, WHO Doc. A56/48 (May 17, 2003); Revision of the
International Health Regulations-Report by the Secretariat, WHO Doc. EBI11/34 (Dec. 15,
2002) [hereinafter Revision of the IHR].
17. International Health Regulations: Working Paper for Regional Consultations,
Intergovernmental Working Group on the Revision of the Int'l Health Regulations, WHO
Doc. IGWG/IHR/Working paper/12.2003 (Jan. 12, 2004) [hereinafter IHR Revision-
Working Paper].
18. Revision of the International Health Regulations: Report of the Secretariat, WHO Doc.
EB113/3 Rev.1 (Jan. 15, 2004).
19. See Gostin, IHRL, supra note 1, at 2624 ("[M]ember States have: (i) not promptly
reported notifiable diseases; (ii) not met hygienic standards at borders; (iii) required health
certificates for non-listed diseases such as HIV/AIDS; and/or (iv) exceeded the allowable
maximum measures by imposing bans on entry of travelers or goods without sufficient
scientific justification. Member States do not comply for diverse reasons such as popular
sovereignty or self-governance, political or economic interests, and incapacity due to lack of
expertise or resources.").
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and international travel, nation states can no longer seal their borders to
escape such hazards, if indeed they ever could. The health and economic
effects of SARS and avian influenza, along with ongoing concerns about
emerging infectious diseases and bioterrorism, may spur WHO Member
States to agree to stronger forms of international health law. Continuing
resistance to effective health regulation is most plausibly explained by
countries' outdated assumptions about sovereignty, horizontal governance,
and entrenched power.20
Sovereignty
Sovereignty, although often criticized, remains an influential idea in
international relations, particularly in matters of health. Sovereignty has
multiple dimensions, but includes political authority over internal affairs,
power to control border crossings, and freedom from external
interference.' The police power to protect the public's health and safety is
a traditional prerogative of national sovereignty. 2  Assertions of sovereignty,
of course, are not always detrimental. A nation's decision to impose
scientifically-based health regulations that are more stringent than
required under international law is not simply a valid assertion of
autonomy. Health regulations based on good science can provide
increased protection for the state and its neighbors.
When used to preserve a poorly regulated status quo, however,
assertions of sovereignty can severely harm global interests in health.
Consider the potential adverse health effects within each of the three main
spheres of sovereignty. First, state power to control internal affairs enables
political leaders to set low standards for public health surveillance and
regulation. Given the cross-boundary effects of health threats, a state's
failure to identify and respond promptly to domestic health threats poses
substantial risks to both its own citizens and other nations. 3 Second, the
state's control over borders allows governments to ignore international
health standards in regulating the flow of goods and people across its
20. David P. Fidler, SARS: Political Pathology of the First Post-Westphalian Pathogen, 31 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 485 (2003).
21. SeeJohn H.Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept, 97 AM.
J. INT'L L. 782 (2003).
22. LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DuTY, RESTRAINT 47-51 (2000).
23. See, e.g., Joseph M. Schwartz, On Doubting Thomas: Judicial Compulsion and Other
Controls of Transboundary Acid Rain, 2 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 361, 374-77 (1987) (noting
the health risks posed to Canadians by the United States's failure to control its contribution
to trans-boundary acid rain in the 1970s).
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borders. The state may either set weak standards (facilitating the spread of
disease) or overly strict standards (needlessly affecting travel and trade).
Indeed, many international disputes arise from travel or trade restrictions
imposed by international agencies or the states themselves.4 Finally, a
state's assertion of non-interference provides an ostensible justification for
failing to comply with international health norms. A country may delay
notifying the WHO of an emerging health threat, prevent its scientists
from sharing information, or refuse to cooperate with international
25
agencies.
Respect for sovereignty is particularly problematic because countries
have built-in incentives for secrecy and inaction in the face of emerging
health threats. Public notification of health hazards can adversely affect a
country's economy and prestige. It can trigger media coverage or travel
advisories affecting trade and tourism and adversely affect the reputation
and electoral prospects of political leaders. One need only look at the
political and economic effects of SARS in Asia and North America to
understand the potentially perverse incentives of transparency in matters
of health.26
Horizontal Governance
Connected to the problem of sovereignty is the preference for
horizontal governance of health threats. Under horizontal governance,
nations regulate health threats through bilateral or regional agreements,
eschewing the imposition of rules by international health agencies. 7
Indeed, since the European sanitary conferences in the nineteenth
century, governments have focused primarily on border controls to
prevent health threats. Horizontal governance is not a particularly effective
method of protecting global health. Border controls can rarely prevent the
24. FIDLER, supra note 5, at 67-68.
25. Consider China's months-long failure to report the SARS outbreak. See Jerome
Groopman, The SARS Epidemic: Global Warning, WALL ST.J., Apr. 23, 2003, at A22.
26. Gostin, IHR, supra note 1, at 2626 ("In many ways, it is in a country's [interests] to
overlook WHO recommendations and regulations.... This dynamic was illustrated during
the SARS outbreaks when China delayed notification to the WHO, and Ontario, Canada,
resisted WHO travel advisories."); see also Keith Bradsher, The SARS Epidemic: The Economic
Impact, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2003, at Al (describing the SARS epidemic as causing "the worst
economic crisis in Southeast Asia since the wave of bank failures and currency devaluations
that swept the region five years ago").
27. Fidler, supra note 20, at 487.
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spread of disease, particularly if the threat is not detected promptly. 8
Vertical governance is likely to be far more effective by setting uniform
standards for national health surveillance and regulation based on
science. 9 Vertical governance means that international health agencies can
set minimum public health capacities at the regional and national levels.
Yet countries exhibit deep reservations about yielding their sovereignty to
multinational authorities. 0 Vertical governance does not require countries
to forego all autonomy, but greater devolution of power would enable the
WHO to establish and enforce a system of global health preparedness that
would make every country safer.
Entrenched Power
The current stagnation in global health governance may also be
attributable to entrenched power structures. Economically and politically
powerful countries, principally in Europe and North America, have had a
disproportionate influence on the global health agenda.3 ' This geopolitical
imbalance results in multiple problems for world health.
First, geopolitical centers of power have acted as if it were possible to
protect themselves from the endemic diseases of the developing world.
The bilateral and multilateral agreements in nineteenth-century Europe
could be understood as an attempt to seal the Western European frontier
to prevent the movement of epidemics from Africa and Asia.32 It is possible
to see a similar dynamic today with border and immigration policies
designed to fend off diseases such as hemorrhagic fever, tuberculosis, and
HIV/AIDS.
3
Second, the developed world has an abiding interest in continuing its
economic vitality through free trade agreements. It is perhaps for this
reason that the IHR focus as much on commerce as health. The avowed
"purpose of [the IHR] is to ensure the maximum security against the
international spread of diseases with a minimum interference with world
28. Id. at 486.
29. Gostin, IHR, supra note 1, at 2626-27.
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., David P. Fidler, Microbialpolitik: Infectious Diseases and International Relations,
14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1, 21 (1998) (noting that "infectious disease control as a matter of
concern for the international system depends to a large extent on [the interests of]
powerful states").
32. FIDLER, supra note 5, at 30-31.
33. Seeid. at 13-14.
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traffic., 34 Yet, the SARS outbreaks demonstrated the need for decisive
public health action, sometimes at the expense of commerce and trade.3'
Developed countries have similarly insisted on furthering their economic
interests through the creation and protection of intellectual property
rights for pharmaceutical companies, making lifesaving vaccines and drugs
36largely unaffordable in developing countries. For example, although
ninety-five percent of the burden of HIV/AIDS is in the developing world,
only eight percent of those in need of antiretroviral treatments in this area
have access to them.
Finally, developed countries have resisted systematic action to provide
technical and financial assistance for health protection in poorer
countries.3 This failure to allocate resources equitably has powerful
ramifications for world health. Resource-poor countries do not have the
means to protect their own populations from the disproportionate
burdens of endemic disease. The marked health disparities between the
rich and poor regions of the world pose fundamental questions of fairness.
At the same time, poor countries do not have the capacity for surveillance
and response to emerging infections to prevent major outbreaks. 9 This is
not simply a problem in developing countries but poses a major concern in
the developed world. In an age of global travel and commerce, health
hazards can move rapidly across the world.4 Health protection is only as
34. WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY, INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS, ADOPTED BY THE
TWENTY-SECOND WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY, BOSTON 2 (3d ed. 1983) (1969).
35. Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., Ethical and Legal Challenges Posed by Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome: Implications for the Control of Severe Infectious Disease Threats, 290 JAMA 3229 (2003)
[hereinafter Gostin, SARS].
36. Giovanni Andrea Cornia, Globalization and Health: Results and Options, 79 BULL.
WORLD HEALTH ORG. 834, 837 (2001) (noting that "even in the cases in which [the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights] allows parallel
imports of cheap generic drugs, trade pressures by [developed countries] limits access to
affordable drug imports").
37. World Health Org., Coverage and Need for Antiretroviral Treatment (June 2004),
at http://www.who.int/3by5/coverage/en/ (noting that only eight percent of those in the
developing world and four percent of those in Africa who require antiretroviral treatment
were receiving antiretroviral treatment in June, 2004).
38. Consider the difficulties encountered in gathering adequate contributions from
developed countries for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. See
Donald G. McNeil, Jr., World's Anti-AIDS Donations Slow, Cutting U.S. Contribution, Too, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 19, 2004, at A18 (detailing the lack of contributions to the Global Fund).
39. FIDLER, supra note 5, at 12-13.
40. LAURIE GARRETr, BETRAYAL OF TRUST: THE COLLAPSE OF GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH
(2000) (arguing that the weakness of the public health infrastructure in developing
V:l1 (2005)
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good as the weakest link, so low capacities in poor countries threaten every
nation.
TOWARD A NEW CONCEPTION OF GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE
To overcome the problems of sovereignty, horizontal governance, and
entrenched power, the international community should consider a new
conception for global health based on the rule of international law.4' The
WHO's proposed revision of the IHRs, if expanded, could serve as a model
for effective public health governance.4 2
The Salience of Health over Trade
The IHR should stress the salience of global health and the WHO's
role in achieving that purpose. The WHO should dedicate itself to the
protection and promotion of global health. Wherever possible, health
rules should respect travel and trade, while assuring that promoting global
health remains the WHO's primary mission. That is the vision of the WHO
Constitution, which does not mention the protection of trade or
commerce.
Wide Jurisdiction
The narrow scope of the IHR impedes the WHO in effectively dealing
with modem health threats. The revised IHR cover "all events potentially
constituting a public health emergency of international concern., 43 This
new approach is preferable because it is flexible, prospective, and covers all
hazards (radiological, chemical, and biological), whether naturally-
occurring, accidental, or intentional. It does not require amendment of
the IHR each time a novel health threat emerges.
Comprehensive Data Collection
Rapid and comprehensive data collection is crucial to global health.
Yet surveillance is hindered by the reluctance of countries to fully
cooperate.44 Global surveillance can be dramatically improved by effective
countries threatens the health and security of developed nations).
41. See Gostin, IHR, supra note 1.
42. See Revision of the IHR, supra note 16.
43. IHR Revision-Working Paper, supra note 17, art. 5(1).
44. FIDLER, supra note 5, at 65 ("The IHR surveillance system has broken down because
Member States regularly fail to notify WHO of outbreaks of diseases subject to the IHR.").
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vertical governance. First, the WHO could establish criteria for uniform
data sets, core informational requirements, and timely monitoring and
reporting. These norms would help set a standard for national and global
surveillance. Second, the WHO should expand its data sources beyond
official government channels. "Small-world networks" consisting of
scientists, health professionals, membership associations, and non-
governmental organizations could considerably broaden the sources of
health information. Finally, the WHO should utilize modern technology
for surveillance, including electronic health records and the internet, to
gather and analyze surveillance data. The WHO is already beginning this
process, and it could be enhanced through the revised IHR.
National Public Health Preparedness
Uniformly strong public health capacities at the national level offer
the best prospect for global health. Prompt and efficient monitoring and
response at the national level is critically important to prevent the
proliferation of disease. 5 To improve national competencies, the WHO
should set minimum standards for laboratories, data systems, and
response. By setting performance standards and measuring outcomes, the
WHO could continually help member states evaluate their public health
preparedness. Compliance with international health norms has been a
serious problem that must be addressed by the WHO. This could be
accomplished through a combination of hard and soft law: mediation,
adjudication, and incentives.
A related problem is that poor countries cannot meet minimum
standards for public health preparedness. The international community,
therefore, should substantially increase technical and financial assistance
for health system improvement in developing countries. This commitment
would not be open-ended; nor would it necessarily be sufficient to
meaningfully reduce global health disparities. However, at a minimum, the
developed world should help assure that all nations have core public heath
capacities for surveillance and containment of emerging health threats of
global importance. This kind of commitment not only allows progressive
development of higher standards of health in resource-poor countries, but
also is in the interests of the industrialized world.
Human Rights Safeguards
The IHR were promulgated before the development of international
45. See Gostin, SARS, supra note 35, at 3231.
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human rights law. As a result, the IHR do not protect individual rights
under international law. Many aspects of global health regulation affect
human rights, including surveillance (privacy), vaccination and treatment
(bodily integrity), travel restrictions (movement), and isolation and
quarantine (liberty). Health measures may also be applied inequitably,
leading to discrimination against unpopular groups, such as migrants and
ethnic minorities. The IHR could demonstrate respect for human rights by
incorporating the internationally accepted norms contained in the
Siracusa principles, which require health measures to be necessary,
proportionate, and fair. 6 Health measures should be based on the rule of
law and provide due process for persons whose liberty is placed in
jeopardy.
Good Public Health Governance
WHO member states have not always followed basic principles of good
public health governance. They have sometimes acted in ways that are
insular and discriminatory, without adequate regard to science. The WHO
could set an example of good public health governance by complying with
the principles of transparency, objectivity, and fairness. The agency's
policies and recommendations should be established in an open manner,
based on scientific evidence, and exercised equitably. The agency gains
credibility by its adherence to science, the truthfulness of its disclosures,
and its fair-dealings with countries, rich and poor alike.
The Future of Global Health Governance
More effective monitoring and management of international health
threats is undoubtedly a global public good. Yet, the question arises
whether international law is the most effective institutional vehicle to
achieve this objective. After all, the WHO has been relatively impotent in
enforcing the existing IHR. During the SARS outbreaks, moreover, the
agency was active and effective without the need for formal international
law.
Certainly, revised IHR will not assure capable leadership and sound
governance by the WHO. Yet, the revision offers an opportunity for a
renewed commitment by the international community to a shared vision of
46. U.N ECON. & SOCIAL COUNCIL SUB-COMM. ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION &
PROTECTION OF MINORITIES, SIRACUSA PRINCIPLES ON THE LIMITATION AND DEROGATION OF
PROVISIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1985/4 (1985), reprinted in 7 HuM. RTs. Q. 3 (1985).
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global health. The revision would give the WHO a clear mission,
significantly enhanced jurisdiction, and formal power to set standards and
make recommendations. By assenting to a far-reaching revision of the IHR,
Member States would cede some control over health threats of
international importance and grant to the WHO a measure of centralized
authority.
International law can help forge a new conception of global health
governance that assures:
* the salience of health over trade;
* broad jurisdiction over conditions of international public
health importance;
* global surveillance through core data requirements and "small-
world networks";
* national public health preparedness by enforcing standards,
creating incentives, and cultivating developmental and
technical assistance;
* human rights protection through incorporation of the Siracusa
principles; and
* good public health governance through transparency,
objectivity, and fairness.
By adhering to the rule of law, the international community can take a
vital step toward better protection against the biological, chemical, and
radiological hazards posed in the modern age.
V: 1 (2005)
